Indiana Law Journal
Volume 80

Issue 1

Article 15

Winter 2005

The Problem of Death Qualification
Nancy J. King
Vanderbilt University, nancy.king@vanderbilt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Judges Commons

Recommended Citation
King, Nancy J. (2005) "The Problem of Death Qualification," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 80 : Iss. 1 , Article
15.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol80/iss1/15

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

2005]

PANEL TWO-THE CAPITAL JURY

Likewise, there are jurors on the other end of the spectrum who I'll call
fundamentalist jurors, not because they are religious fundamentalists, but because they
have a fundamental belief that there is a right and a wrong, and, by Jove, if this person
did something wrong, they deserve to die. These jurors often are incredibly powerful
personalities on a jury. Throw one or two more fundamentalist jurors onto a jury that
came back life and it could tip it the other way. In other words, we must acknowledge
that who is on the jury is going to make a difference no matter what standard of proof
we use, no matter how accurate the scientific evidence. Again, it's a question of
wobble, if you will, that is inherent to giving a jury the moral choice between a life and
death sentence.
I guess, therefore, what I ultimately want to raise, because Ithink this type of forum
is invaluable, is this idea that the death penalty decision is inescapably a moral one.
The Report undoubtedly is correct that if we are talking about a model death penalty
we clearly have to acknowledge the factual accuracyquestion. I think the strides which
are taken in the proposal to increase factual accuracy are essential. But I also think we
have to talk about the moral accuracy question. We have to ask: how much wobble can
we tolerate in terms of deciding whether to have a death penalty? I think some of the
reforms I've heard discussed here would go a long ways to helping minimize that
wobble. But you're always going to have the wobble. And the question we must not
avoid is how much wobble can we tolerate and still have what we would consider a fair
and accurate death penalty?
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I want to emphasize three things. First, I think this proposal has wonderful
possibilities for an impact in non-capital cases and also on investigation techniques.
Someone pointed out earlier that the proposal did not set out regulations for changing
investigation, confession, or eyewitness identification procedures. But it does through
the back door-through deterrence. I think the more that police practices and
prosecutorial charging decisions are deliberately designed to increase accuracy, the
better off everyone is, including victims and the whole society.
Second, I'd like to talk about the dual jury/bifurcation issue because it seems to be
something that we are all wrestling with here on this panel. Perhaps if we talked a little
bit about it, we might actually come up with some way to respond to the concerns that
were raised. Iunderstand that the option presented in the proposal is designed to allow
the defendant the choice at the sentencing stage of either raising the residual doubt or
not. And I, like Ms. Lyon, read that and thought: this misses the point of bifurcation. I
thought the point of bifurcation was to provide the defendant a guilt-innocence
decision by a jury that had not been death qualified. I want to talk more about that
because I think that there were some efforts here to address that.
First, you might increase the accuracy of the guilt-innocence phase decision,
eliminating the bias that comes from death qualification, by death qualifying after a
guilty verdict. But, I don't think you could death qualify the same jury that imposed
guilt. I think that at that point the jury is too focused on whether this person deserves
the death penalty as opposed to the death qualification that takes place before the trial
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starts when it's really an abstract issue. You are talking about abstract principles before
the trial: "Would you ever impose it? Would you never impose it?" I don't think that it
would be a good idea to design a system where you have an extra large jury and then
after guilt, you pick off those who may not be qualified to determine the sentence.
Dr. Sherman's proposal to have dual juries is extremely imaginative. The difficulty
with it is the potential for inconsistencies. If one of the values that we are trying to
promote is accuracy, while also maintaining the "appearance" of accuracy, I cannot
think of anything that might undermine the appearance of accuracy more directly than
to have two juries who have seen the exact same evidence come to different
conclusions. I'm really struggling with that possible outcome.
Perhaps you could have a shadow jury: one death qualified, and one not. The deathqualified one only gets to do anything if the non-death qualified jury finds guilt. Then
you avoid the problem of retrying the case.
The problem I see, particularly in conjunction with the Report's requirement of
scientific evidence to corroborate guilt, is that at the sentencing phase you are inviting
jurors to question whether guilt is proven by the standard that you have set out. Instead
of avoiding the problem of residual doubt, perhaps there is a better way to manage the
presentation of the information to the jury: two shadow juries, one death qualified, and
one not. The defendant can't waive the shadow jury. It would be required in every
case, so you don't have the strategy choice.
Finally, we have yet to talk about something that I think is pretty important to the
administration of the death penalty: the election of the trial bench. I think it's insanethis is my own opinion-to have trial judges elected. We should appoint trial judges or
adopt some sort of modified system of popular election. You might also think about the
issue of whether a defendant can waive a jury. In most places, a defendant wouldn't
waive ajury in favor of ajudge because judges are elected and the incentives are fairly
unidirectional.
In Arizona, judges are appointed in some cities and elected in others. When the
Court in Ring v. Arizona [536 U.S. 584 (2002)], said the jury now has to find the
aggravating features for the death penalty, all of a sudden, judges that had been doing
death sentencing could not do it anymore and it went to the jury. Guess what? More
death sentences in some jurisdictions in Arizona. Some people think that that has to do
with the incentives on the trial judges and the difference between juries and judges in
those different areas in Arizona. It's a big issue that underlies the administration of the
death penalty, and that might be something we could talk about.

OPEN DISCUSSION
BRADLEY

I was a prosecutor in Washington, D.C. for a number of years. A
number of the speakers dumped on the "residual doubt"
standard. My own experience is that it would make a difference
in some cases.
Actually my only contribution to the death penalty literature was
a very small comment proposing this standard. The most
common case that I tried in Washington was an armed robbery
of a High's Store-a High's Store is like a 7-Eleven-where the

